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Abstract 
It is intuitively felt that ambiguity plays a crucial role in human beings’ everyday life and in psychologists’ 
theoretical and applied work. However, ambiguity remains essentially non-problematised in psychological 
science since its foundation. This article analyses positivist and social constructionist perspectives on ambiguity 
in the context of their epistemological and ontological fundamental assumptions. The relational thesis of social 
constructionism is further analysed and it is argued that it constitutes a “weak thesis” concerning the relational 
constitution of human beings. In the second part, a dialogical alternative is elaborated. In this perspective, 
ambiguity is placed in the context of relationship and both are brought to an ontological ground. Therefore, it is 
argued, ambiguity is a fundamental property of human experience and plays a fundamental role in the consti­
tution of (inter)subjective processes. The impact of this thesis on dialogical perspective on self is elaborated. 
Keywords: Dialogism, self, ambiguity, meaning-making. 
Ambigüedad y yo dialógico: en busca de 
una psicología dialógica 
Resumen 
Intuitivamente se considera que la ambigüedad cumple un papel crucial en la vida diaria de los humanos y 
en el trabajo teórico y aplicado de los psicólogos. Sin embargo, en general la ambigüedad nunca ha sido proble­
matizada en la ciencia psicológica. Este artículo analiza las perspectivas positivista y socio-constructivista de la 
ambigüedad en el contexto de sus asunciones fundamentales en el plano epistemológico y ontológico. La tesis rela­
cional del construccionismo social se analiza en mayor profundidad argumentándose que constituye una “tesis 
débil” en lo que concierne a la constitución relacional de los seres humanos. En la segunda parte se elabora una 
alternativa dialógica. En dicha perspectiva, la ambigüedad se estudia en el contexto de las relaciones y ambas 
se sitúan en el terreno ontológico. Por ello, se argumenta que la ambigüedad pertenece fundamental a la expe­
riencia humana y juega un papel fundamental en la constitución de los procesos (inter)subjetivos. Finalmente, 
se elabora el impacto de esta tesis en la perspectiva dialógica. 
Palabras clave: Dialogismo, yo, ambigüedad, construcción de significado. 
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We all know that ambiguity plays a role in our everyday lives. We constantly 
confront ourselves with situations where we have to deal with obscure matters 
or polysemic conditions. Moreover, whenever we start to interpret a single 
human life, ambiguity immediately appears. However, which has been the role 
assigned to this notion within psychology? 
In our view, it is possible to devise two distinct ways in which 
psychologists have been dealing with this matter. The first, a more 
traditional one has been to inscribe ambiguity as an undesirable by-product 
of the imperfection of human beings or, at least, of the imperfection of our 
knowledge about human affairs. We place this view of ambiguity in the 
positivist-empiricist model of science. In that framework, ambiguity is 
understood as “obscurity” and something that we need to overcome and 
exclude in order to achieve the universal and thruthfull knowledge about 
human beings, the goals of this kind of approach. 
The second view of ambiguity that we will discuss brings us into the 
post-modern framework. The social-linguistic critique of the modern 
framework that has been sustaining psychology’s mainstream created a new 
global picture, in the last decades. Within that critical upsurge, the social 
constructionist voice has been especially important, since it has been clearly 
showing the insufficiencies of the traditional models. As a way of surpassing 
individualistic psychology and the perspective of self-contained individuals, 
the social constructionist proposals call our attention to the social-symbolic 
processes of meaning-making. As a result, given the variety of discourses, 
narratives or social praxis, human lives were located in a polysemic space. 
Therefore, ambiguity is recaptured as polysemy and recovered as an 
essential property of human beings. 
Although it may appear an interesting topic of study within the social 
constructionist movement, we consider that this view of ambiguity has not been 
as elaborated as we would expect. We will argue that this derives from the 
difficulties that social constructionism has with ontological issues and reflect 
upon some of the problems of this approach. Even if this movement considers 
human relationships as the fundamental ground of every human life, focusing 
only in the social-symbolic level dissolves, to us, the human subjectivity and 
does not provide a clear possibility to study the human meaning-making 
processes. 
The dialogical alternative that we will present appears to us as a more 
satisfying one, since it states ambiguity as a necessarily present feature of 
the constitution of (inter)subjective processes. If we were to capture an 
image of what we want to say with this assertion, we would choose one of a 
person trying to understand and communicate with another, more 
specifically, in the movement toward the realm of the other. Within that 
movement, there is probably a feeling of getting in touch with that other 
person, but there is always the inescapable feeling of distance, 
misunderstanding and mystery. In other words, a dialogical conception of 
human affairs will move ambiguity to the centre of the discussion and even 
to the very possibility of meaning creation. 
In order to accomplish this, relationship must be brought to an ontological 
terrain allowing psychology to move beyond the positivist / social 
constructionist dispute over reality status. This way, it becomes possible to 
surpass positivist reductionisms, dualisms and reification of self, and social 
constructionist suspicion on reality and subjectivity (see also Marková, 2003a; 
Salgado & Ferreira, in press). 
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The traditional framework of the self-contained individual: Ambiguity 
as ambivalence and obscurity 
When we today reflect on psychological science, we conclude that its course 
and history has been traced as if we were somehow convinced that psychological 
categories consist on reflexes of nature (Salgado, 2003). In other words, it seems 
that we are convinced that psychological concepts, like personality, intelligence, 
unconscious drives or thoughts correspond to natural objects pre-existent to 
psychological inquiries. This assumption emerges from the acceptance of a 
positivist-empiricist model of science based on an “epistemological 
representationalism” (Rorty, 1979). 
Fundamental to this model of science are the notions of “knowledge as 
representation” and “meaning as reference to the object”. It sustains itself on a 
“doctrine of natural types” which express the idea that natural types of entities 
exist in the world, each type being a category based on the sharing of essential 
properties, that is, properties that objects possess by virtue of their own nature 
(see Salgado, 2003). Simultaneously, the internal representations of objects in 
the world are taken to be isomorphic to reality (Rorty, 1979) thus allowing for 
the foundational naturalist assumption that meaning is equivalent to the object 
of reference (Danziger, 1997). This way, linguistic categories reflect these 
properties of objects in the world and therefore meanings emerge as pre­
established entities that exist independently of human phenomena. 
In sum, following the appropriation of a positivist model of science, 
psychology elected an entity as its study object – the mind – and pursues the 
project of describing it univocally. To accomplish this, psychology builds itself 
upon a mentalist / cognitivist paradigm approaching the question of 
subjectivity from the stance of mental representations. 
This brief analysis of that traditional framework is intended to show how 
western philosophical discourses on truth and certainty and on the individual 
mind as instigator of meaning led psychology to include ambiguity in the same 
discursive framework of uncertainty and ambivalence, never attributing to it a 
theoretically autonomous status nor a fundamental value in psychological 
phenomena. As Gergen stated, the capacity for diversity and pluralism, the 
tolerance for ambiguity, the unknown and the limitations of psychological 
knowledge seem underdeveloped in mainstream positivist psychology (Gergen, 
Gülerce, Lock & Misra, 1996, p. 501). 
The ontometaphysical base, thus allowed psychology to assume an 
epistemological authority regarding people’s subjective worlds, from which 
emerged the belief of a privileged access to the internal world of people and a 
belief in the possibility to univocally describe psychological processes. This way, 
methodologically, individuals are included in comparability frameworks and 
their differences being analysed by reference to generalized criteria. As such, a 
great deal of mainstream has been reducing subjectivity to its mechanical 
features. The mechanistic point of view, while trying to reduce any subjectivity 
creates a world of objective facts. In this, ambiguity becomes a problem of 
methodological limitations or human imperfections. Obvious and discussed 
examples of this are psychological evaluation instruments or psychopathological 
diagnosis. 
Ambiguity becomes obscurity and the correctness of our psychological 
descriptions is dependent on our ability to reduce ambiguous issues. For 
example, the DSM has been evolving in the last three decades as a system 
primarily devoted to the reduction of ambiguous features of clinical diagnoses 
(e.g., DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Observable signs 
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and reportable symptoms are highlighted as ways of decreasing any doubts. 
Each client or patient must be considered in terms of those objective (and 
objectifying) defined categories. As such, the subjective and dynamic properties 
of each person are clearly disregarded. The arguments supporting such system 
claim for the facilitation of the communication between professionals and the 
objectivity of such procedure. In other words, the DSM tries to reduce 
ambiguity to the minimum. However, such reduction of ambiguity has several 
costs and, in fact, it may not reduce ambiguity at all. First, the DSM is not so 
“objective” as it is claimed. Even the defenders of this neo-Kraepelinian system 
(e.g., Shorter, 1997) recognize that the growing number of diagnostic categories 
and the higher rates of mental disease have also to do with sociocultural issues, 
such as the discovery of new psychopharmacological products and the installed 
lobbies within this domain. Moreover, there is another by-product of this kind 
of “medical categorization”: the specific diagnostic labels work as “mediational 
means” by which the identity of the person is constructed (as it usually happens; 
see Valsiner, 1998; and also Wertsch, 1991). However, the cultural forces are not 
fully acknowledged by the professionals and by common people, in general, 
creating the beliefs (1) that cultural tools (in this case, the DSM’s labels) are 
naturally shaped and (2) that the human psychological problems are solely 
intrinsic and objective properties of the single person (see Wertsch, 1991, for a 
revision of similar analysis about categorization of students as “normal”, 
“special” or “handicapped”). 
In parallel, regarding psychological processes, psychology included 
ambiguity in the discursive context of ambivalence, the simultaneity of 
conflicting psychological processes (e.g., feelings) or even lack of self­
knowledge. Clear examples would be the Freudian accounts of the psychological 
functioning and the cognitive attempts to describe and promote rational forms 
of thinking. Curiously enough, in these perspectives ambiguity is connected 
with the solipsistic and obscure features of the Cartesian ego, and the solution 
is an old one: to found an absolute way to exclude our own ambiguity and 
uncertainty. 
The social-linguistic critique: Ambivalence as polysemy 
Social constructionism (e.g., Gergen, 1991, 1994) social-linguistic critique 
and dialogical relational perspectives on self (e.g., Hermans & Kempen, 1993; 
Leiman, 2002, 2004; Wortham, 2001) and knowledge (Marková, 2003a) make 
the constraints of mainstream positivist psychological science unavoidably clear. 
In fact, these perspectives emerged from the questioning of traditional 
philosophical emphasis on the conditions of truth and on an ego as instigator of 
meaning that formatted a psychological science based on an epistemological 
authority and on “self-contained individualism”, characterized by “firmly drawn 
self-other boundaries and an emphasis on personal control” (Sampson, 1988, 
p.16). 
Within psychology, social constructionism presents psychological categories 
as social-linguistic constructions, thus, emphasizing its origin in social­
relational conditions idiosyncratic to discursive communities. In continuity 
with this assumption, in the last decades the social conditions of meaning 
emergence (of what we take to be real, we could say) and its narrative or 
discursive organization have become emblematic themes of epistemological 
configurations or metatheoretical models that followed the crisis of modern 
epistemology. 
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The elemental notions are that 1) reality, is the result of social-relational 
agreements of discursive communities that construct it and 2) that the narrative 
form constitutes the fundamental linguistic, psychological, cultural and 
philosophical framework through which we create meaning and understand the 
nature and conditions of our existence (Brockmeier & Harré, 1997, p. 264). 
Thus, social constructionism is able to withdraw ambiguity from the 
emphatic discourses on truth, predictability and control. Seeing reality as 
constructed in socially situated discourses, social constructionism emphasizes 
the multiplicity of coexistent and concurrent realities in social symbolic 
domain. Discourses are seen to be included in power relations that determine 
their referential value between each other. Discourses about the self or discourses 
about human inner worlds are considered in this same global framework. 
Therefore, ambiguity is re-entered in this global discourse concerning 
multiplicity and polysemy of meaning. 
However, it appears to us that the issue of ambiguity remains essentially 
theoretically undeveloped, particularly if we think about the role of difference 
within and between people on innovation and the creation of new meanings. 
The state of affairs may seem rather paradoxical. On the one hand, polysemy is 
not only recognized, but is also highlighted as a fundamental condition of our 
semiosphere. On the other hand, it remains to be explained how is it possible to 
create new meanings – in other words, how polysemy is brought to being. 
In our view, this problem is a result of the social constructionist difficulties 
with ontological issues. In fact, we will argue that psychology is in need of an 
ontological shift, where the relational processes are considered the constitutive 
and ontological basis of the psychological realm. From a dialogical point of view, 
the social constructionist approach presents a “weak thesis” about the relational 
constitution of human beings. In fact, the exclusion of the Ego and Alter (or I 
and Other) relationship from their discussion, gets aside the necessary tensional 
space of meaning-making. Thus, it is our conviction that the possible way out 
of this labyrinth is to claim a dialogical ontology for psychology. In this sense, 
we need to further discuss which should be “relationships” position within this 
discipline. 
In search of a relational ontology for Psychology: Is the social-symbolic 
field a viable ontological ground for Psychology and meaning-making? 
Social-linguistic and dialogical oriented perspectives share the emphasis on 
the relational nature of the psychological realm. This represents a major shift in 
the way psychology conceives relationships since we are allowed to move from 
the idea of those relational processes as possibilities of an aprioristic, 
transcendental self (in the traditional psychological models) and we are lead to 
consider them as the elemental constitutive matrix of psychological domain. In 
this movement, these perspectives also came to underline the volatile and 
ambiguous features of human psychological processes, emphasizing the 
“processes of social interchange” and discourse. 
However, placing the relational assumption on the ontological ground 
represents a major problem for social constructionist perspectives, particularly 
by the defence of an “ontological muteness” (Gergen, 1994, p. 72). For instance, 
Gergen argued that “The domain of the relational is no less constructed than 
anything else we take to be real – whether in mind or nature” (Gergen, 1999, 
p. 114). Thus, the relational ground seems to lose its ground. This ontological 
muteness of social constructionism seems to be creating, in a self-referential 
mode, difficulties in the defence of their own proposals. 
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Despite several claims from social constructionism towards the rejection of 
any ontological compromise, in fact, it is impossible to assert anything without 
such a compromise. Several authors within that movement have come to realize 
this and stating the opposite claim – that “it is not possible to be ontologically 
mute” (O’Connor & Hallan, 2000, p. 242). On this base, it has been stated that: 
The ontology presupposed in discursive psychology takes persons to be 
originating centres of activity. Since they [persons] are ontologically elementary 
they have no internal psychological complexity. (…) Cognitive processes are 
properties of discourses, and hence have their primary mode of being in 
interpersonal symbolic interactions. (Harré, 1995, p. 369) 
As such, we see in this approach, a focus on the social and linguistic, in 
detriment of the personal and experiential. Instead of solving the Cartesian 
dualism, they seem to be moving to the other side of the pole. Nevertheless, is 
the social constructionist approach (and its implicit or explicit social-symbolic 
compromise) a viable and alternative description of our psychological existence? 
We see two complementary problems with the social-discursive solution. 
First, it does not allow for an intrinsically relational conception of self since 
relationship is positioned and discussed always outside the domain of the 
individual. Therefore, it maintains the traditional ontological separation 
between the individual and the social (Marková, 2000). Consequently, social 
constructionism holds on a weak thesis of relationship. Moreover, since 
relationship is considered “as constructed as anything else” and therefore 
dissolved within social-symbolic realm, individuals have to be considered 
previously constituted. But individuals remain largely a non-covered topic of 
analysis. 
The second and complementary problematic question has to do with the 
consequences of such a weak thesis of relationship. At this point what come to 
be inquired are the sociological conditions of language use. The following 
statement from Bourdieu (1982, cit in Jacques, 1985) seems to uncover the 
entangled problem, namely, the absence of the tensional properties of 
relationships inhabited by individuals: from a strictly linguistic point of view, 
it does not matter who can say it does not matter what, the simple soldier may 
order his captain to “clean the latrines” (…), from a strictly sociological point of 
view, (…) it’s clear that it does not matter who cannot affirm it does not matter 
what (p. 71) 
The underlying problem thus resides precisely in the “it does not matter who 
can or cannot say it does not matter what”. The social constructionism emphasis 
on the social-linguistic perspective leads individual’s subjectivity to be retracted 
into social realm. Yet, there are no two human beings alike; there are no two 
equal human positions towards the world; and there is no possibility to fully 
access or understand other people’s feelings or thoughts. Moreover, the very 
possibility of communication resides on difference. The pragmatic argument 
that substitutes ontological commitment (which we can state for instance in 
Gergen’s repeated emphasis that his proposals do not intend to be true but are 
only contributions to social praxis; e.g., Gergen, 1999, 2001) looses its ground 
since, as Jacques (1985, p. 78) has clearly phrased: in any way we might come 
to define it, dialogism concerns the transactional structure of each enunciation. 
All the forms of pre-established homology, disregarding the multiple, 
compromise the possibility of dialogue. 
In moving to the social-symbolic domain in detriment of intrinsic relational 
qualities of individuals, social constructionism appears to be one more of those 
traditional universal categorical schemas. Even though social constructionism 
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emphasizes multiplicity, it previously has disregarded the alterity structure 
between any two individuals, somehow maintaining the “separation thesis”. 
Forms of separation 
The notion of separation thesis of Robin West (1997) addresses those 
discourses that assume individuals are separated from one another and that first 
there are individuals, that then engage in relationships with other individuals. 
Reflecting on these notions, Carr (2003) argues that in some schools of 
psychology the “language of the self and other gets used in a manner to carry on 
the implication that self is necessarily separate from, and prior to, other” (p. 
117). As Carr (2003) then concludes “self and other are cast as constituent 
elements in a perceived relationship of the intersubjective nature of the human 
condition itself, but the implied presumption is that self must necessarily be 
privileged over other” (p. 118). 
Psychology developed to recognize and emphasize the intersubjective and 
relational nature of human beings, which contemporarily has led these notions 
to become most frequent in psychological literature. However, the maintenance 
of this separation thesis prevents psychology from assuming a relational 
ontological framework. In a social linguistic critique, whether from post 
structuralism, social constructionism, or narrative framework, the I is 
considered as a social symbolic category and the other is conceived as a 
generalized social symbolical other. In this social symbolic ontology what seems 
to be lost is the simultaneous and by-directional role of a real other in the 
constitution of a real I. Or, to use Jacques (1985) words, what is missing is the 
perception that the most important thing in language is not linguistic (p. 18). 
Simultaneously, the fundamental tension entangled in pragmatic relationships 
between the real I and other is disregarded in favor of social symbolical 
processes. 
In a way, we are dealing with an apparent paradox. On one hand, we need to 
separate the person and the social; on the other hand, we need to put together 
those two poles. Valsiner (1998) introduced a distinction between two possible 
strategies of separation that may lead us out of this labyrinth. The 
aforementioned and traditional strategy is called an “exclusive separation” 
thesis, operating a clear separation between the person and the social world as 
two distinct entities. In contrast, Valsiner (1998) presents the inclusive 
separation orientation as characterized by an emphasis on the “processes that 
separate and unite different parts of the same whole in simultaneous terms” (p. 
15), thus distinguishing three facets – the person, the environment and the 
relationship. The simultaneous emphasis on the primacy of the relationship and 
on the radical asymmetry and alterity of the two elements in relationships are 
fundamental assumptions of dialogism. Consequently, following this strategy, 
the person and the social become two bounded elements, distinct but united. 
Calls for a dialogical psychology and its difficulties 
For some decades now, this point has been made concerning the need to 
move beyond a philosophy of language, a symbolic or linguistic criterion for an 
intersubjective perspective on human being (e.g., Habermas, 1992; Jacques, 
1985, 1991). Following this thought, the psychological study of newborns has 
arrived at a theory of intersubjectivity that has been described by Trevarthen 
(1998) as “no less than a theory of how human minds, in human bodies, can 
recognize one another’s impulses, intuitively, with or without cognitive or 
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symbolic elaborations” (p. 17). It is such a project that we think psychology 
should look forward. 
In a dialogical perspective, although the emphasis is explicitly on the 
addressivity of every psychological phenomena and therefore on the constitutive 
role of the Other to individual psychological processes, it is interesting to notice 
that, except for a few authors (Marková, 2003b; Salgado & Ferreira, in press), 
ontological discussion scarcely emerges. Simultaneously, and perhaps as a reflex 
of this paucity of ontological elaboration of the notion of dialogicality, dialogical 
perspectives on self remain based on discourse (Wortham, 2001), signs (Leiman, 
2002), or imagination (Hermans, 2004). As may be seen, and despite 
recognition of the significant advances introduced by these approaches, what all 
of them share is the implicit reliance on mental representations, and on 
consciousness movements, as an underlying ground. 
However, as Deleuze (1995) wrote: “The history of the long error is the 
history of representation, (...). For the Same, or the Identical, has an ontological 
sense” (p. 301). Thus, the forgetfulness of alterity and difference on the 
description of the psychological realm leads us always to the traditional 
ontological commitments that we are trying to escape. “Difference is not and 
cannot be thought in itself, so long as it is subject to the requirements of 
representation” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 262). This is, to think on the Other as a 
representation is to think on the Other from the perspective of the Same 
(Marcos, 2001). As such, these authors are leading us to the conclusion that the 
dialogical project, based precisely on structures of alterity, on the notion of 
insoluble difference and asymmetry between I and Other, will only be attainable 
following the substitution of the Same (of mental representations) as ontological 
entity. The question therefore seems to be how to build a strong thesis on 
relational constitution of human subjectivity by answering how can the other 
be in myself and not be me? 
Dialogical psychology: Towards a relationally instituted human being 
and a relationally functioning self 
The difficulty the previous models (positivism and social constructionism) do 
not seem to overcome appears to reside in how to maintain individual 
subjectivity and complexity while conceiving a relationally instituted human 
being. In fact, psychology has been addressing this issue for decades. Relation­
object model in psychoanalysis, or interpersonal schemas (Markus & Cross, 
1990) in cognitivist oriented models are some examples of this. Nevertheless, 
this has been done maintaining consciousness as the criterion of human 
subjectivity. 
Dialogism, emphasizing the addressivity of every human phenomena allows 
to surpass the exclusive separation strategy to which we earlier attended to. 
However, the concept of dialogism will only be of particularly relevant value to 
psychology if considered as an ontological and even an epistemological 
framework. In dialogical literature, there have recently been some proposed 
arguments that point this way (see Marková, 2003a, 2003b; Salgado & Ferreira, 
in press). From another point of view, it can be said that the concept of 
dialogism will allow a moving forward of the positivist / social constructionist 
dualism in the possibility of being conceived as an ontological and 
epistemological framework. 
Considering the relational principle as logically and transcendentally 
irreducible and centering the problems of reference and subject in a 
communicational space, dialogical framework is allowed to move beyond both 
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self as sole instigator of meaning (cf. Jacques, 1991), and meaning as criterion 
of subjective life. Instead of conceiving relationship as an emergent possibility 
of self, dialogism emphasizes the ontological primacy of relationship which 
leads to a conception of the psychological realm as inextricably interconnected 
with communicational processes. Therefore, we will conceive relationships as 
logical pragmatic spaces that reconcile the referential and interlocutive relation 
(Jacques, 1991). Moreover, those assumptions lead us to search for a description 
of psychological elements as communicational agencies instead of psychological 
objects (Jacques, 1991) therefore allowing to begin solving the problem of the 
other in the self. 
Relation as ontologically and transcendentally irreducible 
The notion of dialogicality states a relational principle (cf. Jacques, 1985, 
1991). This means that the ego loses its ontological primacy, its aprioristic 
condition since it exists only in the moment in which a relational process is 
initiated with an other. Psychological existence comes to being in that relation 
with an other. Roberts (1989) states this in a curious way when he says that, in 
Bakhtinian thought, the reality principle coincides with the radical otherness 
principle. In fact, the dialogical concept implies this notion of radical 
asymmetry between any two people, which establishes the background for a 
possible relationship. In the space of significative indetermination between two 
people, lies the possibility for relation and intersubjectivity since the tension 
originated between any possible positions in any communicational act is a 
conditional presupposition of communicational occurrence (Bakhtin, 1986; 
Marcos, 2001). 
As we said, dialogical framework introduces in psychology the conceptual 
instruments to move beyond traditional egotism and recent dilution of 
subjectivity by social constructionism by assuming the postulate of relational 
constitution of subjectivity. Of fundamental importance here, is to underline 
that this movement becomes possible due to the emphasis made by a dialogical 
framework on communication. As Marková (2003b) stresses, following 
Bakhtinian thought, “Ego-Alter exists only within the realm of 
communication” (p. 257). In fact communication appears to be the theoretical 
space to place I-Other inseparability and relational precedence preventing 
theoretical and methodological dialogical formulations from returning to the 
traditional philosophical and scientific frameworks that shaped psychological 
science. 
Meaning as difference 
The image is quite common: imagine a world where everybody looks the 
same, wears the same clothes, reads the same newspapers, says the same things 
everyday, have the same thoughts – a world with no difference. What would be 
meaning in such a world? Probably, it would be a set of fixed and immutable 
entities – a world without any ambiguity. Nevertheless, it would be a 
dehumanized world, a world with no particular voice, in a word, a totalitarian 
society. 
This image illustrates the following idea: the exclusion of ambiguity of the 
human realm is only possible if subjectivity can be completely removed. In fact, 
the search of an eternal and absolute point of view – the God’s eye view 
(Putnam, 1981) – is only possible if every specific, individual and idiosyncratic 
perspective is removed and silenced. This justifies why “subjectivity” is still so 
commonly regarded as something negative by common sense. The long quest 
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for that absolute point of view, so typical of positivistic thinking in psychology, 
creates objective descriptions – but disembodied, a-historical, and impersonal. 
Such words are words of no particular person—and therefore these are words of 
no one. 
Human meaning, in that sense, is brought to being by difference, contrast, 
tension, disagreement. On a dialogical perspective, a human existence is a 
communicational existence. Thus, it always needs two communicational 
agencies (the addressee and the addressed others), and the communicational act 
shows the way of overcoming the difference between those two poles (I/Other). 
In a sense, meaning is created through a common understanding; but the 
original difference and asymmetry between those poles is a necessary condition 
for that bridge. In other words, meaning is always dependent on the play 
between sameness and difference. 
This perspective establishes tension as a necessary condition of meaning. 
Dialogue, so commonly conceived of as a way of establishing a common 
understanding and cooperation, is also a matter of struggle, misunderstanding, 
and tension. 
Ambiguity and the dialogical self 
If we assume a dialogical perspective, we will need to embrace ambiguity as 
an emergent and continuously present property of selfhood and meaning­
making processes. Meaning is conceived as a process of communication 
between, at least, two agencies. In turn, this relationship is understood as 
something constantly permeated by a “radical difference” between Ego (the 
elocutionary agency, the I) and the Alter (the addressed audiences, the Other). 
In that way, meaning is no longer seen as a fixed entity because it is always a 
matter of negotiation in a communicational act. In other words, meaning is 
always a product and a tool of communication. Thus, there are two 
complementary sides in this process: on the one hand, the creation of meaning 
creates a bridge between those two poles of the relationship (I/Other, or 
Ego/Alter), a common agreement that enables the mutual coordination; on the 
other hand, this process necessarily involves a tension space of difference and 
contrast between those same poles. Deleuze (1995) claimed something rather 
close to this, when he stated that the Same is not able to communicate with the 
Same. In our view, relationship is always a matter of joining together and 
articulating what is different. 
Therefore, we could say that the very possibility of meaning-making is 
lodged in this distance between I and Other. We are not claiming that difference 
and contrast are more important than similitude and closeness: we are just 
saying that relationships are grounded in those two complementary sides. As 
Bakhtin argued, the I emerges as a contrast with the Other, with whom a 
relationship is established. Therefore, the I occupies the experiential centre of 
the process, but this I emerges by reference with an Other. Thus, in a dialogical 
perspective we can no longer separate subjectivity and intersubjectivity, because 
they are interconnected processes. Moreover, meaning-making is something 
emergent from that process of creating some kind of bridge between two 
different poles. Thus, a specific meaning is always a matter of positioning 
toward a specific background, by which the I establishes a relationship with the 
Other. 
Therefore, a dialogical perspective assumes that intersubjectivity is grounded 
in a tensional space, where difference plays a vital role. There is a difference 
between I and Other, but there is also other sorts of differences necessarily 
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present. We are able to distinguish, at least, two other kinds of differences 
involved in a process of relationship. 
First, there is the difference between what is communicated and the referents 
of that communication. The signs, gestures and actions of a specific 
communicational act refer to particular objects, but they are not immanent 
properties of those objects – they could be better conceived as possible and 
mediated actions toward the world and the Other inscribed in some particular 
social and more or less consensual praxis. It is possible to reduce those signs to 
their logical and formal properties, as happens with words in a dictionary. 
However, that would be to forget their fundamental property – they are tools 
by which we create relationships, and they have their roots not in the objects 
themselves, but in the multiple possible ways we may act upon those same 
objects. Thus, we face a scenario of some indeterminacy of meanings. In other 
words: meanings are not fixed entities derived from a direct relation in which 
the “communicational content” is equal to the “object”; instead, they are ways 
and products of negotiation with the Other relating to possible actions toward 
that object. Thus, the processes of meaning-making are necessarily polysemic 
spaces, and not ways of discovering the final and absolute truth about the world. 
However, there is still a second issue about “difference” particularly pertinent 
to the problem of ambiguity. The asymmetry between Ego and Alter calls our 
attention to the problem of subjective appropriation. This problem has been 
discussed by different lines of thought (Valsiner, 1998), but inside dialogism it 
has been a topic of discussion at least since Bakhtin. In his discussion about the 
role of words in his system of thought (see Bakhtin, 1981, 1984, 1986), he 
argues that every utterance is half given and half created. Whenever we use a 
communicational and more or less consensual sign in order to communicate, we 
are using something that we inherited from our community. However, the 
specific subjective experience that is undergoing in this process involves an 
active process of reconstruction that assigns a particular and unrepeatable 
meaning to the signs being used. Thus, there is a process of appropriation by 
which the sign acquires a personal and subjective texture. We would like to add 
that we see this whole process as experiential, affectively charged, by which a 
sense of self is constantly constructed and reconstructed. 
Moreover, if we consider that this happens in the context of an irreversible 
flow of time (Valsiner, 1998), each passing moment always has a twofold 
dimension of old and new, of shared and personal. The integration of 
(psychological) time within this equation of meaning-making is essential. We 
see a strong connection between the dialogical dynamics and the psychological 
constitution of the present and irreversible moment. Human life is a process of 
continuous and present adaptation to the past in face of an anticipated future 
(the next moment, the absent but anticipated words of the other). The arising 
meaning at this moment (for example, a given verbal sign that solves the puzzle 
of the present moment) is unrepeatable. It may be quite similar to past 
situations and to future ones, but the specific contextualization – and the lived 
moment in which the sign is created experienced sign created moment – is 
unique, unrepeatable, and, also ambiguous. Meaning of signs is always about 
change (Marková, 2003a). The same may be applied to any kind of human 
action: it may be similar to something else, it can be a kind of personal habitual 
pattern, but it is never the same event of being. Mystery and change is our 
psychological milieu; re-actualization and self-organization are the continuous 
task. 
Those fundamental features of human life make it clear that subjectivity is 
necessarily present – a dimension that has been somehow forgotten in 
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psychology (Salgado & Hermans, 2005). However, if subjectivity and personal 
and unrepeatable experiences are necessary dimensions of every human life at 
each passing moment, this singularity creates a necessary ambiguity in our lives. 
It is thus, if we assume that subjectivity and ambiguity are necessary conditions 
of our psychological realm, we will have to confess several limits in our scientific 
psychological studies. Nevertheless, we think this option is preferable, instead 
of reducing our lives to their pretended “objectified” properties. 
In sum, a dialogical perspective assumes difference between I and Other as a 
necessary condition for meaning-making. Departing from this axiomatic claim, 
ambiguity will be an emergent property of every communicational act, since it 
involves processes of personal, subjective, and unrepeatable meanings. 
We will try to clarify this perspective, exploring a simple situation of 
interpersonal communication. Imagine that a person A states “x” (for example, 
a specific desire “I would love to take some days off with you”). The addressed 
person, B, clearly understands this statement. If that happens, we could say that 
a communicational bridge was established between those two people. Thus, for 
the sake of the argument, we will suppose that there is, at least, a partial mutual 
definition of the situation. In that case, something is defined and ambiguity is 
reduced. Nevertheless, ambiguity is not eliminated, because the specific 
meaning of “x” for A is different from the meaning it has for B. Moreover, that 
ambiguity feeds the following mutual actions that will take place, usually in 
order to create some sort of joint activity. In that process, ambiguity may be 
reduced, but the whole interchange between those two communicational 
agencies is fed by the always present ambiguity. Intersubjectivity appears as a 
dance of mutual coordination, where ambiguity never disappears. 
However, we can probably have an even more graspable phenomenological 
feeling of ambiguity in our intrapersonal experiences. If the intrapersonal space 
is configured by alterity, our self-experience is also permeated by this otherness. 
I am familiar with me, but I am still a kind of stranger that questions and argues 
with me. Launched in irreversible time, from moment to moment, a person 
gains a constant feeling of these divergences and fluidity. At this point we come 
closer to Merleau-Ponty (1969), who claims that we are never completely self­
present. The self, as a live agency, is more a matter of “how” than a matter of 
“what”, more a matter of continuous becoming than a matter of analytical 
description. Others are probably more easily objectified and monologized than 
me, something that may explain why people tend to interpret others’ actions as 
the result of personality traits while they tend to have a more situational 
interpretation of their own behaviours (Ross, 1977). We would say that 
ambiguity lies at the very heart of the subject. 
What are the consequences of this line of reasoning for the conceptualization 
of self-identity processes? Psychology has been built as if we were convinced 
that human lives can be reduced to their precise and objective features. Thus, 
the study of personal lives has been somewhat oblivious to their ambiguous 
properties. In addition, most of the time, ambiguity has been equated with lack 
of self-control or self-knowledge and, as such, as something to be eliminated. 
In our view, this is only part of the story, and thus, we feel the need to 
redefine the role of ambiguity. It is also our conviction that a dialogical 
perspective is well prepared for that task. Indeed, in a dialogical perspective it 
is possible to define self-identity as a matter of relationship with oneself (Salgado 
& Hermans, 2005), a process in which ambiguity must play a vital role, 
fostering movements toward higher levels of complexity. Self-regulation has 
been described as a process composed by two complementary operations: 
differentiation and hierarchical organization (Valsiner, 2005). In face of the 
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ambiguous features of our lives, constituted by an intersubjective and fluid 
matrix, we may be more or less “open” to novelty and “otherness”. In other 
words, we may vary in our ability of integrating the unavoidable differences. 
Openness to the other and the corresponding openness to the new meanings 
brought by others’ eyes are movements that foster differentiation. However, 
such openness is also a challenge and, frequently, a struggle, because it implies 
the development of new and more complex forms of self-regulation. Whenever 
that integration is achieved, the potential scope of experiences becomes broader 
and more complex. However, that openness must not dissolve the self on the 
other, something that alerts us to the need of some closure. 
Conclusion or The never-ending process of overcoming the difference 
with oneself 
In a dialogical perspective, the problem of self-identity is conceived of as a 
matter of constantly relating with oneself (Jacques, 1991; Salgado & Hermans, 
2005). It is through that process of self-relating that I can recognize myself as a 
continuous entity that goes through several changes, while remaining the same 
person. However, this possibility of self-relating is grounded in some kind of 
internal separation between the “teller” (or “doer”) and the “listener” (the 
audience or the Other). Thus, the internal psychological space is a matter of 
sameness and difference, the necessary conditions for any communication. 
This sort of internal division is always present in each passing moment. Thus, 
self-identity processes can be directly associated with the mythical figure of the 
double-faced Janus: there is always the active I that addresses an Other-in-self, 
but this Other is still Me. Human existence always becomes co-existence, even 
if only with oneself; and co-existence is an ambiguous kind of existence. In each 
passing moment, the self becomes a new blurred image and a challenge to the 
last image we have just created of ourselves. Thus, we are constantly thrust in a 
space filled with our own ambiguous features. 
This process of self-relating, by which an I-position addresses another part or 
parts of the same person (the addressees) is probably commanded by regular and 
familiar patterns. As Valsiner (2000) claims, the self is a lazy problem-solver. 
Nevertheless, this constant ambiguity and difference within oneself is always 
creating new challenges that may foster the development toward new levels of 
complexity and abstraction. This dimension has not been fully explored in the 
dialogical framework, but it seems reasonable to suppose that people may 
progress toward higher levels of abstraction, creating a more integrated self­
perspective. 
Thus, the multiplicity of contexts and daily problems that a person confronts 
creates a great variety of possible I-positions, some of them fostering inner 
conflicts, oppositions, and strong doubts about self-definition. Ambivalence, 
doubts, conflicts, may work as signs of perpetuating fluctuations within oneself 
(see Valsiner, 2002), but all these oppositions are also challenges that appeal to 
new kinds and innovative solutions. Nevertheless, the flow of time and the ever­
changing conditions of our existence creates a dynamic field where no final and 
precise answer is possible to the question “who am I?”. 
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